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 1 
SUMMARY 
The Association Agreement between the European 
Union (EU) and Ukraine is a comprehensive treaty 
covering Ukraine’s political and economic 
relationship with the EU. The trade-related content 
establishes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Area (DCFTA), which is an important part of the 
overall Agreement.  
The Agreement was negotiated during several 
years of the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich. It was initialled in March 2012, 
and was due to be signed at the EU’s Vilnius summit in November 2013. But 
at the last minute President Yanukovich decided not to sign it, thereby 
triggering the Maidan uprising and ultimately Russia’s aggression in 
annexing Crimea and the hybrid war in the eastern Donbas region. The 
signing of the Agreement therefore took place later in two stages, first for its 
political content in March 2014 by Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and 
then for its economic content in June 2014, by the newly elected President 
Petro Poroshenko. The Ukrainian Parliament, Verkhovna Rada, and the 
European Parliament ratified the Agreement in September 2014, and the EU 
member states followed in the course of 2015 and early 2016 (with one 
member state still to complete ratification). 
The provisional application of the Agreement started in November 
2014, except for the DCFTA, which entered into force ‘provisionally’ in 
January 2016, after a one-year delay at the request of Russia.  
While much of the contents of the Association Agreement and DCFTA 
are highly technical, its signing in 2014 was an act of strategic and 
geopolitical significance in the history of Ukraine. It became emblematic of 
a vital struggle, to both replace the Yanukovych regime at home and to resist 
the attempt by Russia to deny Ukraine its ‘European choice’ as a democratic, 
independent state. The costs of this struggle have been tragically high in 
terms of territory, the economy and human life, but these losses must 
strengthen the country’s resolve to succeed. 
2  SUMMARY 
The political and economic objectives of the Agreement are 
fundamental for the future of Ukraine as an independent and secure 
European state, and can be simply defined.  
The political purpose is to deepen the realisation of Ukraine’s 
‘European choice’. This means making a reality of fundamental European 
values, namely democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and 
norms of the European security order. Membership of the European Union 
is not prefigured in the Agreement, but neither is it excluded in the longer 
run. 
The economic purpose is to help modernise Ukraine’s economy, by 
boosting trade with the EU and internationally and by reforming economic 
regulations in line with best European practice. Combined with an 
improving business climate, Ukraine has the potential to become a good 
location for foreign and domestic investment, producing exports for the EU 
and international markets. 
Ukraine does not have to ‘re-invent the wheel’ in many technically 
complex areas, where the choice of regulations and standards that differ 
from tested international practice would be costly and inefficient. Still, this 
normative alignment is far more than a technical matter, and it goes to the 
heart of the urgent task of establishing sound, corruption-free governance. 
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1. POLITICAL PRINCIPLES 
The Agreement is premised on a commitment to 
pursue and respect “…the common values on which 
the European Union is built – namely democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
and the rule of law – [which] are essential elements 
of this Agreement.”  
After the change of government that followed 
the Maidan protests, Ukraine resumed its pursuit of 
democratic reforms. The most resilient component of the democratic system 
in Ukraine has been the ballot box. Although many of the elections in the 
1990s and 2000s were not considered to be completely free and fair, they 
were still able to ensure a sizeable representation of the political opposition 
in the Parliament. The scope of reforms since the Euromaidan has been 
limited, however, and their pace slow. The reforms focused primarily on the 
decentralisation and independence of the judiciary, and less on contentious 
issues such as electoral rules.  
Ukraine’s human rights record is now relatively positive overall, 
while still needing improvements. In practice, the majority of those rights 
and freedoms are generally protected. Notable exceptions concern the right 
to a fair trial. The National Human Rights Strategy of Ukraine was approved 
by the president in August 2015, addressing 24 strategic areas that include 
the entire spectrum of human rights, in particular anti-discrimination and 
the protection of national minorities.  
On the other hand, Crimea and the eastern Donbas, which are not 
controlled by the government, see a return to authoritarianism and 
systematic human rights violations. The Russian administration in Crimea 
initiated criminal proceedings against a number of Tatars on fabricated 
charges, and shut down media outlets. The rule of law is virtually absent in 
the eastern Donbas territories controlled by insurgents. 
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2. RULE OF LAW AND MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 
The rule of law is the weakest component of 
democratic governance in Ukraine. Success in 
improving the rule of law and anti-corruption policy 
is universally considered to be indispensable to the 
overall success of the Association Agreement and 
Ukraine’s economic future.  
Significant reforms were at last underway by 
mid-June 2016, notably for the judiciary and 
prosecutor’s office. For example, according to the new legislation, judges 
will henceforth be selected on a competitive basis by the High Council of 
Justice. Regarding corruption, over the last 15 years Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index has consistently ranked 
Ukraine very unfavourably. The judiciary, police and public administration 
have largely been perceived as the most corrupt institutions in the country. 
The situation has not improved since the revolution of 2013-14, but the 
authorities have launched a series of reforms aimed at enhancing the rule of 
law and curbing corruption. 
The objective for Ukraine to obtain visa-free access for its citizens to 
travel to the EU is of the highest political and practical importance, and the 
official criteria for granting visa-free access have been fulfilled. In December 
2015, the European Commission formally recommended to the Council of 
the European Union that the EU apply the visa-free regime to Ukrainians 
with biometric passports for short trips to the EU. It is now up to the Council 
of the EU and the European Parliament to give their final backing for visa-
free travel. 
Border management has become a matter of increasing and indeed 
strategic significance for Ukraine, for which the EU has introduced specific 
programmes. The Agreement sets the stage for comprehensive dialogue and 
cooperation on legal and illegal migration, trafficking and smuggling of 
people, border management, asylum, return policies and the movement of 
people.  
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3. FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
The Association Agreement aims to facilitate the 
gradual alignment of Ukraine’s foreign, security and 
defence policies with those of the EU at bilateral, 
regional and multilateral levels. Cooperation 
between Ukraine and the EU in the foreign and 
security domains has been building up for over a 
decade.  
Since 2014, however, Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea and its hybrid war in the Donbas region have dramatically changed 
the focus for joint cooperation efforts in the foreign and security policy 
domains.  
The ‘Minsk’ peace process was launched with the support of the EU. 
Active diplomatic efforts by the EU and its member states, combined with 
sanctions imposed on Russian individuals and entities, contributed 
significantly to the reduction of hostilities. This should in principle lead 
towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict, but progress remains elusive. 
Ukraine supports the EU’s sanctions imposed on Russian targets and 
considers them as a tool to curb aggression. It joined in certain EU decisions 
by imposing several sets of sanctions, which included travel bans and asset 
freezes on individuals and entities responsible for action against Ukraine’s 
territorial integrity; an embargo on the import and export of certain goods 
from/to Russia, including arms and related materials; and the banning of 
flights of Russian airlines to the country. Ukraine also advocates tightening 
international sanctions against Russia.  
Increased alignment with EU foreign and security policies will 
reframe Ukraine’s relations with Russia and the rest of the world. Ukraine 
intends to advance proposals for joint EU-Ukraine positions based on a 
monitoring of the security situation in Eastern Europe.  
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4. MARKET ACCESS FOR GOODS 
Tariff liberalisation is the basic starting point for a 
free trade area. The DCFTA almost completely 
liberalises trade in goods between the EU and 
Ukraine, but with a significant asymmetry in that the 
EU has already liberalised totally and immediately 
for most products, whereas Ukraine will liberalise 
for many products over 3 to 7 years. This means 
exceptional opportunities for Ukrainian producers to 
boost their exports to the EU market before facing 
full competition on the home market.  
Due to political pressure by Russia, the EU and Ukraine postponed 
the provisional application of the DCFTA to 1 January 2016. However, the 
EU liberalised access to its market in April 2014 by providing Ukraine with 
special ‘autonomous’ measures. 
These measures have so far only had a limited impact on Ukraine’s 
exports to the EU due to the suspension of production in the occupied 
territories, logistical problems and downward price trends for world 
commodity markets. 
The EU’s share in Ukrainian exports and imports has increased 
because of a sizeable fall in trade with Russia, however. The structure of 
exports to the EU has shifted towards machinery, fats and oils, prepared 
foods and animal products. 
For many agricultural products tariff-free treatment is still to be 
limited by tariff rate quotas. These will not be the primary constraint on 
Ukrainian exports until EU food safety standards are met.  
There are continued safeguards for Ukraine’s car industry, which are 
a major source of protection, which will help Ukrainian producers in the 
short run, but at the expense of their integration into competitive European 
supply chains, and with costs for consumers.   
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5. TRADE REMEDIES 
The DCFTA includes rules on ‘trade defence’ 
measures that the EU and Ukraine can take against 
imports from the other party that cause or threaten 
to cause injury to the domestic industry, notably 
anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard 
measures. These DCFTA provisions essentially 
incorporate the relevant rules of the World Trade 
Organization. 
The key instrument is for anti-dumping measures. If a company 
exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges on its 
own home market, it is considered to be ‘dumping’ the product. This allows 
the government of the importing country to act where there is a ‘material’ 
injury to the competing domestic industry. The importing country may then 
impose an anti-dumping duty to correct damage to its industry.  
Until 2005, several Ukrainian exports to the EU were subject to anti- 
dumping measures, mainly metallurgical and chemical products, in which 
Ukraine has large production capacities that until recently have benefited 
from artificially low energy input costs. More recently the energy costs for 
industry have been brought into line with international market prices. As a 
result, the number of EU anti-dumping cases against Ukraine has decreased. 
Currently, the EU is applying anti-dumping measures on certain Ukrainian 
steel pipes, tubes, ropes and cables. 
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6. CUSTOMS SERVICES 
For the DCFTA to work well there have to be high 
quality customs services at the frontiers with efficient 
and speedy facilitation of traffic, avoiding delays and 
corruption with long queues of heavy trucks. Moving 
products across the border of Ukraine remains a 
cumbersome and costly process, compared with 
neighbouring countries. Frequently, vehicles are 
forced to queue at border crossings for hours, or even 
days for commercial trucks, waiting for customs 
clearance and other controls.  
The EU and Ukraine adopted a strategic framework for customs 
cooperation in 2012. This initiative identified various priority areas, most of 
which are carried over into the DCFTA. One initiative relates to safe and 
fluid trade lanes to achieve maximum trade facilitation and enable reliable 
business, with customs acting as a link in the supply chain. For example, the 
EU and Ukraine intend to create fast lanes to move pre-approved eligible 
goods across the border quickly. Recognition of ‘authorised economic 
operators’ (AEOs) could be part of this process. In the EU, enterprises can 
apply for AEO status to benefit from reduced controls and simplified 
customs procedures. 
Corruption scandals have recently stimulated the government to 
advance reforms to the customs service. In August 2016, ‘single customs 
windows’ are due to be launched, the duration of controls reduced and 
additional monitoring equipment introduced to ensure transparency and 
accountability. 
Ukraine is progressing towards fulfilling its legislative commitments, 
with its Customs Code broadly aligned with EU legislation, although several 
amendments are still required. The main task for Ukraine is to ensure the 
efficient implementation of existing legislation.  
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7. TECHNICAL STANDARDS FOR INDUSTRIAL 
GOODS 
Since import tariffs between the EU and Ukraine are 
set to disappear almost completely, non-tariff barriers 
such as technical standards will become the main 
obstacle to trade. In order to tackle these barriers, 
Ukraine will adopt the relevant EU legislation, 
standards and procedures. This will be a long and 
complex process, but one that is fundamental to 
modernising and making Ukraine’s industry 
internationally competitive.  
The European standards system has two tiers: first, EU harmonisation 
laws, which cover the general methodology and institutional framework, 
and around 30 directives covering broad sectoral product groups such as 
machinery; and second, around 5,000 product-specific ‘harmonised 
standards’ that provide the technical means to comply with the essential 
health and safety requirements.  
Ukraine has adopted a strategy to eliminate technical barriers in trade 
with the EU by 2020. It is making good progress in adopting the first level of 
EU relevant directives, and in progressively adopting the huge number of 
European standards.  
More precisely, as of 1 January 2016 there were 17,889 national 
standards in Ukraine, including 10,964 aligned with international and 
European standards. Compared to previous years, two major changes 
occurred. First, the total number of standards was reduced by 40% from 
29,600 in 2014, mostly due to the abolition of 14,000 obsolete and conflicting 
GOST (former Soviet) standards. Second, the number of national standards 
harmonised with European and international ones increased by 24% 
compared to a year before, and their share doubled from 30% to 60% in total.  
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8. FOOD SAFETY REGULATIONS 
Food safety standards, officially entitled ‘Sanitary 
and PhytoSanitary Measures (SPS)’ are required to 
facilitate trade in agricultural and food commodities 
and plants covered by SPS regulations, and 
safeguard human, animal and plant life or health.  
Ukraine commits to do this comprehensively 
through alignment with a mass of 255 product-
specific EU regulations. There is nothing unusual 
about this large number of regulations (Russia and the US have similar 
numbers); the big advantage of EU-based regulations is that it assures not 
only high health standards, but also access to European and international 
markets. This should contribute dramatically to the development of 
Ukraine’s agriculture and food industries.  
Implementation of this ambitious programme will be spread over 
several years until 2021, and requires a modern infrastructure of laboratories 
for testing and checking products. In view of the substantial cost of these 
measures the Association Agreement allows Ukraine to exempt very small 
farms and various traditional products from comprehensive conformity. In 
addition, there are procedures for export-oriented agri-food enterprises to 
allow their individual supply chains to be certified for conformity with EU 
standards for specific products such as poultry, before the whole of the 
Ukrainian poultry sector becomes compliant with the new rules.  
The EU supports some major technical assistance projects to help 
improve the food safety control system ‘from farm to fork’.  
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9. SERVICES 
Development of a dynamic and competitive service 
sector is of huge importance for the modernisation 
of Ukraine’s economy. In this regard the DCFTA 
provides for a comprehensive and extremely 
detailed liberalisation of establishment and trade in 
services, still subject to reservations - more by the 
EU than Ukraine.   
The services in question are extremely 
diverse, including financial, business, distribution and retailing 
telecommunications and postal services, tourism, health, transport, 
recreation and sports. This means that the regulations governing 
international trade in services is also a highly complex matter.  
The provisions of the agreement are organised under three headings: 
i) establishment, meaning the right to set up business in the other party; ii) 
cross-border supply of services, for example outsourced IT software and iii) 
the temporary presence in the other party of individuals, such as consultants 
for business purposes. 
In general terms, the parties undertake to treat service providers of the 
other party no less favourably than their own, which is a rule applied at the 
level of the World Trade Organization. Yet there are many reservations 
limiting the application of this rule, which are detailed in annexes to the 
DCFTA.  
For several services sectors, such as finance and telecommunications, 
the DCFTA envisages the full integration of Ukraine into the EU’s internal 
market. However, this far-reaching provision is conditional upon Ukraine’s 
adoption of relevant EU legislation. 
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10. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
Public procurement is of great economic importance 
to both the EU and Ukraine; it accounts for around 
18% of GDP in the EU and offers an enormous 
potential market for Ukrainian companies. The 
DCFTA provides for the gradual and reciprocal 
liberalisation of the parties’ public procurement 
markets under the strict condition that Ukraine 
implements the EU’s key public procurement rules. 
Ukraine has to ensure that the public purchase of 
goods, works and services are transparent and fair, guarantee sound 
competition, tackle corruption and get the best value for taxpayers’ money.  
The DCFTA also defines basic standards regulating the award of 
contracts, which are derived directly from EU public procurement law and 
include the principles of non-discrimination, equal treatment, transparency 
and proportionality.  
Ukraine has to designate a central executive body that will also be 
responsible for the implementation of the rules. It also has to establish a 
separate, impartial and independent body that will review decisions taken 
by contracting authorities or entities during the award of contracts.  
Public procurement policy reform has been a government priority for 
several years and remains so, given the general government deficit and the 
need for fiscal consolidation and greater efficiency in public spending. 
Overall, current government policies comply with the schedule of 
public procurement reform envisaged in the DCFTA. A new law on public 
procurement was approved in 2015 and the roadmap for reform was 
adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers in February 2016. 
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11. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
In our knowledge-based economies the protection of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) is important, not 
only for promoting innovation and creativity, but 
also for developing employment and improving 
competitiveness. The DCFTA requires Ukraine to 
modernise its IPR system. These reforms will 
contribute to a stable legal environment in Ukraine 
for the protection of IPR, which is crucial for 
attracting foreign investment.  
The IPR system covers several domains: copyrights, trademarks, 
designs and patents and ‘geographic indications’ (i.e. protection of 
traditional brands such as champagne, although Ukraine secured a long 
transition period of 10 years to phase out the use of some well-known 
European brand denominations, including champagne). Ukraine is a 
member of the main IPR-related international organisations. 
Despite substantial legislation and infrastructure, IPR protection in 
Ukraine is quite poor, as shown in evaluations undertaken by the US and the 
EU. The major IPR problems in Ukraine are: 
- unfair and non-transparent administration and collection of copyright 
fees,  
- widespread use by government agencies of illegal software,  
- failure to combat the widespread online infringement of copyrights 
and 
- non-payment of royalties by state broadcasters.  
Ukraine’s IPR system has some gaps in relation to the best European 
and international practices, which will be addressed by forthcoming 
legislation. The major improvements will focus on strengthening the 
enforcement of industrial property rights; institutional and organisational 
changes for protecting geographic indications; mechanisms to increase the 
protection of rights and interests of copyright holders; and a unified 
procedure for collecting fees due under copyrights.    
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12. COMPETITION POLICY 
An effective competition policy that controls 
monopolistic behaviour by companies and trade-
distorting subsidies by the government is essential 
for the sound functioning of a modern economy. It 
assures a level playing field for economic operators, 
lower prices for consumers with better quality and 
wider choice, and reduces the scope for corruption.  
EU competition law deems illegal: i) 
concerted practices by undertakings, which have the object or effect of 
impeding, restricting, distorting or agreements, ii) the abuse by an 
undertaking of a dominant position, or; iii) concentration between 
undertakings, which results in monopolisation or a substantial restriction of 
competition.  
The provisions in the DCFTA for competition policy are substantial 
and strong in terms of legal commitments, requiring Ukraine to reform 
control of monopolistic behaviour and state subsidies in line with 
established EU practices. 
Ukraine has already largely aligned its competition legislation with 
EU and international standards, and further legislative and institutional 
reforms are envisaged. The adoption of the Law on State Aid marks a 
significant achievement. While Ukraine’s anti-monopoly legislation is 
relatively well developed, enforcement has remained very poor. 
Effective implementation and enforcement of these and other 
envisaged competition laws will be the key challenge. This requires a 
competent and more independent Anti-Monopoly Committee. 
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13. STATISTICS  
A modern and internationally comparable statistical 
system is indispensable for informed policy-making 
and for the work of the business sector and civil 
society. All the post-Soviet states have had to face the 
same challenges of radical reform to their statistical 
systems, notably to move from systems that 
essentially served the needs of the state to systems 
that serve the private sector and society as a whole. 
More technically, there has to be a greater use of sampling methods rather 
than exhaustive data collection.  
Ukraine has a relatively well-developed statistical agency. 
Programmes for harmonisation with European methodologies are extensive 
and broadly proceed as planned.  
Current progress and plans for the implementation of EU standards 
cover an extensive range of statistical series, including business sentiment, 
structural statistics, a labour force survey, household survey, education 
statistics, gas and electricity prices, agricultural holdings, fisheries, livestock 
and meat statistics, and pesticide statistics. For these series implementation 
is at various stages of completion. Overall, Ukrstat is likely to be able to 
implement EU standards on statistics as scheduled, as no major increase in 
scale or complexity of data gathering is required. A shortage of resources 
holds back some important census and survey operations, however. 
There remain several serious technical challenges: 
- The website of Ukrstat is antiquated and navigation can be difficult 
for new users.  
- Ukrstat.gov.ua is not searchable, either internally or through search 
engines (except through unofficial sources).  
- There is no interface to download data series.  
  
 
 
 
PART III. ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
PART III. ECONOMIC COOPERATION  19 
 
14. MACROECONOMICS AND FINANCIAL 
ASSISTANCE 
In the first decade of the post-Soviet period, Ukraine 
suffered a more dramatic recession than many of the 
other transition economies. Despite progress in 
privatisation and price liberalisation, many 
structural reforms were postponed.  
Economic recovery started in 2000, led by a 
global commodity price boom for metals. Real GDP 
grew by 6.9% on average between 2000 and 2008. But 
in 2009 these gains were partly reversed because of the global financial crisis. 
And then in 2014-15 Ukraine suffered a very severe recession and losses of 
infrastructure as a result of the war with Russia over the eastern Donbas, on 
top of the effects of the global recession. Recovery from the recession is 
beginning, but slowly. 
The EU is supplying significant financial assistance to help economic 
recovery through multiple channels, including macroeconomic loans 
alongside the IMF, budget grants and investments from the EIB and EBRD. 
For the period 2014-20, the EU announced a package of possible financial 
measures totalling €11 billion, including grants from the EU budget and 
investments by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 
The EIB expects to increase its investments in Ukraine in the period 
until 2020 to €3 billion, up from the €2.4 billion invested between 2010 and 
2014. New commitments made in 2015 amounted to €857 million, devoted 
to the energy, transport and environmental sectors. 
The EBRD is also stepping up its activity in Ukraine, planning up to 
€5 billion of investments up to 2020. It will concentrate on energy efficiency 
and energy security, industry, quality infrastructure and the financial sector. 
Projects approved in 2015 include several in agri-business and municipal 
environment and infrastructure.  
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15. FINANCIAL MARKETS 
The DCFTA envisages the comprehensive adoption 
by Ukraine of the European system for regulating 
banks, insurance and securities markets. After a 
series of major financial crises, the priority now is for 
the financial markets to be safe and efficient for 
consumers, and systemically sound for the economy.  
The global financial crisis of 2008-09, with the 
collapse or near-collapse of major banks of systemic 
importance, has led to a radical strengthening of the capital reserve 
requirements of banking systems. In addition, Ukraine’s financial system 
was hit by another major crisis in 2014-15 as a result of the conflict with 
Russia. Consequently, at the starting point of the Agreement, Ukraine’s 
financial sector was in the midst of extreme tensions regarding the stability 
of the banking system and the servicing of external debt, following a major 
financial crisis. 
Nevertheless, the government is proceeding with a comprehensive, 
long-term programme for regulatory modernisation, anchoring on EU 
legislation, which is a crucial part of the general economic modernisation 
process. 
The DCFTA sets out precise conditions for Ukrainian banks and other 
financial institutions to be granted “full internal market treatment” by the 
EU, meaning no restrictions on the freedom to establish agencies, branches or 
subsidiaries in the EU (and vice versa for EU financial institutions), and 
similarly no restrictions on freedom to provide services.  The conditions 
amount to full compliance by Ukraine with EU legislation.  
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16. TRANSPORT 
Transport has been a key sector for the EU’s internal 
market development. As a result, the EU has a well-
established body of law and policies on transport. 
The Association Agreement aims to expand and 
strengthen Ukraine’s cooperation with the EU in the 
field of transport to promote efficient, safe and secure 
systems with greater interoperability.  
This will be fundamental to integrating 
Ukraine’s industries into the European supply chain, and to boosting contact 
between people, especially when visa-free travel becomes possible. 
The DCFTA sets out the EU’s detailed standards and regulations for 
road, rail, inland waterways, sea and intermodal transport, which Ukraine 
will progressively adopt. These concern the qualifications of transport 
operators, the technical safety of vehicles and vessels, and the activities of 
inspection bodies. 
Air transport is regulated in a separate EU-Ukraine Civil Aviation 
Area Agreement, which is pending full ratification and will in due course 
open the air transport market to low cost competition. Ukraine’s aviation 
sector has developed very quickly in recent years. This is partly thanks to 
the visa-free regime for EU nationals to travel to Ukraine, visa facilitation for 
Ukrainian citizens to travel to Europe, and investments in infrastructure for 
the Euro 2012. 
Ukraine occupies a pivotal place in the Pan-European Corridors for 
road and rail connections. The EBRD and EIB are supplying investment 
funding for improvements in these and other major transport 
infrastructures. 
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17. ENERGY 
The reform and modernisation of Ukraine’s energy 
sector is a challenge of the utmost priority, for both 
economic and geopolitical reasons. Ukraine is 
currently the most wasteful energy user in the 
industrialised world. If it approached average 
European energy efficiency standards it would no 
longer need to import gas. The provisions of the 
Association Agreement are highly relevant for the 
necessary policy reforms in the energy sector. 
Ukraine’s energy policy is now finally undergoing radical and long 
overdue reforms, centred upon the alignment of energy prices with import 
costs and the unbundling of gas distribution structures in line with IMF and 
EU requirements. 
Unfortunately, the implementation of provisions of the Association 
Agreement through the linked Energy Community Treaty is behind 
schedule. 
Gas supplies are now being diversified away from the former total 
dependence on Russian supplies, with the aid of reverse-flow pipelines 
linking to neighbouring EU states. 
Energy-savings programmes, in line with EU standards, are vital to 
achieving independence of gas supplies. But there are still major obstacles to 
large-scale investment in energy saving in the household sector; collective 
action by housing associations is very difficult in the many apartment 
buildings, where people living on state welfare and pensions cannot afford 
the investments.   
The major programme of building a sarcophagus to secure the 
destroyed nuclear reactor site in Chernobyl is proceeding, with major 
funding from the EU, the EBRD and other international donors. 
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18. ENVIRONMENT 
The environmental provisions of the Association 
Agreement are very ambitious and commit Ukraine 
to cooperation over the whole landscape of 
environmental policy issues. Implementation will be 
a long and difficult process, given Ukraine’s starting 
point, but it will ultimately mean a radical 
transformation of environmental quality and the 
modernisation of key heavy industries in the country. 
The effective implementation of the ambitious environmental 
provisions of the Agreement would upgrade Ukraine to the top 30 countries 
in terms of global environmental performance indicators. 
This huge improvement of environmental standards is only likely to 
be observed in the long run because just the legal transposition of EU 
directives will take several years, while their technical implementation will 
take up to 18 years in certain cases. 
Some directives are straightforward acts of policy modernisation and 
will help establish effective environmental quality and resource 
management systems. Others are very challenging in terms of economic 
costs, for example for large combustion plants and industrial emissions. 
The EIB and EBRD are among the major financial institutions capable 
of making substantial contributions to the funding of necessary investments, 
leveraging in other public and private sources. These investments in 
environmental quality will generate payback in terms of improved 
production efficiency and health benefits for both present and future 
generations. 
If timetables for the implementation of specific EU laws prove to be 
too fast it is possible for them to be extended, if agreed by the two parties in 
the Association Council. 
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19. THE DIGITAL SECTOR 
The ‘digital’ family of provisions of the Association 
Agreement cover electronic communications and 
postal services, the information society, and audio-
visual policy.  
Ukraine is already showing encouragingly 
positive trends in this broad sector of strategic 
importance for an internationally competitive 
economy. Ukraine’s IT industry employs 74,000–
100,000 people, with the majority of specialists working in IT outsourcing.  
Overall, 44% of Ukrainian citizens have access to the internet, 148 
universities train IT specialists, and there is almost complete coverage of the 
territory of Ukraine by mobile networks. Every year Ukrainian universities 
graduate about 15,000 IT specialists. Ukraine is a popular destination for IT 
outsourcing due to a large number of skilled developers and moderate costs 
compared to the US or Western Europe. To develop the industry, Ukrainian 
IT companies are creating IT clusters in major Ukrainian cities (Lviv, 
Kharkiv, Lutsk, Dnipro and Odesa). These clusters aim to increase the 
quality of IT education in local universities, offering programming courses 
and conducting advocacy and popularisation campaigns. 
The Agreement provides for comprehensive alignment on EU 
regulatory practices, mostly within four years. The approximation 
programme is progressing well.  
The provisions on electronic communications fall under the special 
category of service sectors that are treated in the Agreement as having a 
specific roadmap for securing “full internal market treatment”, which means 
that when the alignment with EU legislation is complete Ukrainian 
enterprises in this sector will be treated exactly the same as EU enterprises 
in the EU.  
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20. CONSUMER PROTECTION 
EU legislation is intended to ensure a high and 
consistent level of protection for the health and safety 
of consumers by means of strict common safety rules 
and standards for products and services circulating 
within the internal market. Many EU policies directly 
affect consumers. This is especially the case in areas 
such as telecommunications, digital, energy, 
transport, and food. This trend of mainstreaming 
consumer protection is reflected in the Association Agreement, which 
integrates the interests of consumers into its policies. 
Although a system for the protection of consumer rights in Ukraine 
was first set up more than 25 years ago, further efforts are necessary to 
ensure that the system is effective, efficient and aligned with EU regulations. 
Ukraine’s obligations in the area of consumer protection under the 
Agreement can be divided into several categories. First, general 
commitments related to information exchange and the improvement of 
information provided to consumers; second, obligations related to product 
safety; and third, institutional and administrative procedures for the 
protection of consumers and the enforcement of consumer rights. 
For Ukraine, the key task is to find a proper balance between 
enhanced consumer rights protection, a reduction in the administrative 
burden on businesses, and the elimination of corruption incentives 
associated with state control functions. For instance, in 2016, a moratorium 
on state inspections of entrepreneurs with a turnover below UAH 20 million 
was introduced. This decision was welcomed by businesses, while being 
lambasted by representatives of consumer rights protection organisations, 
who claimed that it undermined consumer safety. 
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21. COMPANY LAW 
To further support Ukraine’s transition to a fully 
functioning market economy and to create a stable 
environment for investment, the Association 
Agreement includes provisions on company law, 
corporate governance, accounting and auditing.  
Ukrainian legislation complies with most if 
not all the EU’s rules of company law, taking into 
account revisions of the law by the Parliament in 
2014 and 2015. Ukraine has thus actually moved to adopt EU standards 
relatively quickly. This should improve its business climate and help create 
a transparent environment for companies, including an appropriate level of 
protection for company shareholders and creditors. 
Ukraine is to harmonise its legislation with that of the EU for annual 
accounts of certain types of companies and consolidated accounts. Recent 
EU legislation simplifies and reduces the administrative burdens for firms. 
Ukraine will also need to adopt international accounting and financial 
reporting standards. These measures will facilitate greater cross-border 
comparability of accounts. 
The EU and Ukraine agreed to cooperate on the further development 
of corporate governance policy in line with international standards. This 
includes recommendations for the appropriate remuneration of directors of 
listed companies, and on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors 
and the committees of the supervisory board. After the 2008-09 financial 
crisis new recommendations were developed to require a balance between 
fixed and variable remuneration. Termination payments (‘golden 
parachutes’) should also be subject to various limitations. Listed companies 
should publish statements on these aspects of their remuneration policy. 
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22. AGRICULTURE 
Sometimes referred to as ‘the bread basket of 
Europe’, Ukraine’s expanses of rich black earth 
endow it with both a huge capacity and potential in 
the agricultural and food sectors. Necessary reforms 
to the farm sector were slow to get under way in the 
post-Soviet period, but are now progressing well.  
The contribution of the Association 
Agreement is essentially through policy dialogue, 
supported by technical assistance and investment finance. The Agreement 
contains many references to EU agricultural legislation, but there is 
flexibility in the extent to which this should be applied, with no binding 
timetables. 
In 2014-15, several important reforms were undertaken. They were 
guided by the Coalition Agreement drawn up in compliance with a 
memorandum of understanding with the IMF. Also, in 2015 the Ministry of 
Agrarian Policy and Food, with the support of Ukrainian and EU experts, 
developed a strategy and action plan for 2015-20 to guide agricultural 
reforms over the next five years. 
Deregulation measures dominated the agricultural reforms of 2014-
15, cancelling much unnecessary legislation with immediate effect and 
mostly without creating new regulations. 
Nevertheless, some aspects of agricultural policy in 2015 were 
controversial. One of the most notable was the prolongation of the 
moratorium on land sales until 2017. As a result, farmers are still unable to 
use their land as collateral security for loan finance and therefore have 
restricted access to financing. According to the 2020 strategy documents, 
there should be a land market pilot project in 2016. Its implementation 
remains to be seen. 
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23. EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY 
The Association Agreement sets out a comprehensive 
agenda for the gradual alignment of Ukrainian 
practice to EU legislation under three basic headings: 
labour law, anti-discrimination and gender equality, 
and health and safety at work.  
A major reform of Ukraine’s Labour Code is 
long overdue, to modernise the Code inherited from 
the Soviet period.  
The existing code has remained very rigid, providing de jure little 
flexibility on the labour market. It focuses on rights and guarantees for 
employees, while paying little attention to employers (dismissal of 
employees is very difficult).  
There have been heated debates on the approval of new Labour Code 
for many years, but a law taking account of the new realities of the market 
economy and modern labour market requirements is before the parliament 
for adoption. The new draft law envisages more flexibility in labour relations 
and more rights provided to employers, and will be largely in line with EU 
legislation. The major differences with the current version of the Labour 
Code include: 
- Written contracts are to become compulsory. 
- Employers will be able to dismiss employees for well-defined reasons.  
- The working week is to be limited to 40 hours, or 44 hours if agreed. 
- There will be regulation of flexible work schedule and home work.  
- There is a provision against gender discrimination.  
- The list of reasons for fixed-term contracts is to be extended.  
- The redundancy payment is to be increased.  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24. EDUCATION, TRAINING AND CULTURE  
The Association Agreement sets out basic aims for 
the education system, notably its reform, 
modernisation and convergence in the field of 
higher education with the Bologna Process, and the 
enhancement of the quality and relevance of higher 
education.  
Several indices reveal that Ukraine’s 
educational standards and human capital 
endowment performance is ‘high’, comparable to that of its immediate 
neighbours Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. This suggests a solid human 
capital basis for a major recovery in economic performance. 
The EU’s largest direct contribution is through the Erasmus+ 
programme for educational exchanges, training, youth and sport. In the field 
of higher education, Erasmus+ supports the following main actions: 
- joint Masters degrees promoting the mobility of students and staff;  
- capacity-building projects to modernise higher education institutions;  
- support to policy dialogue in the Higher Education Reform Expert 
network;  
- teaching and research in the field of European Union studies.    
During the 2014-20 period, more than 4,000 young Ukrainians are 
expected to benefit from university exchanges, and 7,000 Ukrainians will 
have the opportunity to take part in youth exchanges under the European 
Voluntary Service programme. 
Cultural cooperation between Ukraine and the EU is based on the 
promotion of exchanges and the mobility of arts and artists. Ukraine 
participates fully in the EU’s Creative Europe programme for cultural and 
creative sectors.  
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25. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE 
The Association Agreement sets out wide-ranging 
objectives for cooperation in the area of science and 
technology. This has already been followed up by a 
landmark operational agreement signed in March 
2015 for Ukraine’s full participation as ‘associated 
country’ in the Horizon 2020 programme.  
Horizon 2020 is the centrepiece of the EU’s 
scientific research activity, endowed with very 
substantial funds (€80 billion) for the period 2014-2020. The areas eligible for 
project funding cover both the natural and social sciences. Ukraine’s 
associate membership of Horizon 2020 allows it to participate on the same 
basis as an EU member state.  
In the EU’s preceding research programme, Ukraine was ranked 
among the top-ten most performing third countries, having successfully 
participated in 274 projects in several priority areas (environment, climate 
change, transport, aeronautics, nanotechnologies, materials technologies, 
biotechnologies, food and agriculture and space). Its enhanced status now in 
Horizon 2020 should open the way for an even stronger performance. 
The EU’s most important body for space exploration is the European 
Space Agency (ESA), with which Ukraine has a cooperation agreement. The 
ESA focuses on cooperation in satellite systems, earth observation and global 
monitoring, and space science and applied space technologies. In July 2015, 
the Ukrainian State Space Agency and ESA started consultations on 
cooperation between Ukrainian rocket-and-space industry enterprises and 
European companies within ESA projects. Possible directions under 
consideration for bilateral cooperation include Earth Remote Sensing (ERS) 
and rocket carriers.  
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26. EU AGENCIES AND PROGRAMMES 
The EU operates as many as 46 agencies, which are 
semi-autonomous and specialised bodies funded 
and controlled by the EU, with the objective of 
supporting the functioning of EU policies. There are 
also around 45 programmes, most of which are 
funded and administered by the European 
Commission. Of these around half are open to 
participation by Ukraine. 
Such participation offers a useful means of in-depth integration of 
professional experts and administrative organisations with EU counterparts 
and aids reform processes. 
The agencies of most interest to Ukraine include the following: 
- European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 
- European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)  
- European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA)  
- European Defence Agency (EDA) 
- European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST)  
- European Police Office (EUROPOL)  
- European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at 
the External Borders (FRONTEX) 
- European Environment Agency (EEA) 
Membership of an agency requires negotiation of a specific 
international agreement and a decision on the financial contribution of the 
partner. To ease the financial burdens on Ukraine temporary rebates can be 
negotiated. 
Membership of the agencies and inclusion in programmes gives full 
access to their infrastructure and governing bodies.  
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27. CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 
Ukraine shares 1,152 km of land borders with EU 
members Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, 
and about 1,000 km of border with EU associate 
Moldova, which offers extensive opportunities for 
enhanced cooperation at the cross-border regional 
level. The Association Agreement calls for cross-
border cooperation in general terms, and in specific 
sectors such as transport, energy, education, 
tourism and health, and the modernisation of cross-
border emergency services. 
Ukraine’s border regions have common history, traditions, and strong 
personal and business ties to their EU counterparts. To maintain these ties 
Ukraine has signed agreements with them that establish special provisions 
for local cross-border relations.  
In December 2016 a new programme for Poland-Belarus-Ukraine for 
the years 2014-2020 was adopted with a budget of €183 million from the EU, 
aiming, inter alia, to promote local culture and preserve historical heritage.   
The Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine 2014-20 programme focuses 
on the promotion of local culture and the preservation of historical heritage, 
environmental protection, climate change adaptation and disaster 
management, with a budget of €81 million. 
A programme for Romania-Ukraine 2014-20 will see joint investments 
in education, economic development, culture, infrastructure and health, 
with a budget of €60 million. 
Ukraine is also part of the Black Sea Basin cross-border cooperation 
programme for 2014-20, which aims to improve environmental protection in 
the coastal regions. 
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28. CIVIL SOCIETY 
Civil society in Ukraine has long been at the 
forefront of change, from the Orange Revolution 
(2004) to the Maidan uprising (2013-14). Ukrainian 
civil society has consistently shown a great sense of 
unity and determination in its quest for democracy.  
The EU has itself long supported Ukrainian 
civil society, including financial assistance (€10 
million in 2014). The NGOs have functioned both as 
a watchdog to provide input to the EU on the progress of reform in Ukraine, 
and as a pressure group vis-à-vis the government, thus acting as a driver of 
change. The Association Agreement establishes joint civil society platforms 
and advisory groups to address issues arising under the Agreement.  
Ukrainian civil society experienced rapid growth after the Maidan 
uprising. An example of a civil initiative arising during the Maidan was the 
Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR), which unites different NGOs with 
the aim of monitoring and stimulating reforms in the country. The most 
active are expert groups where the NGOs have expertise in areas such as 
anti-corruption, judicial and media reform.  
To influence European policy-makers, in March 2014 Ukrainian think 
tanks organised the Ukrainian Think Tanks Liaison Office in Brussels. The 
Office helps think tanks to organise conferences and expert discussions on 
topical Ukrainian issues in Brussels and in EU member states, to present and 
promote its members’ research and establish communication channels 
between members and EU institutions. Think tanks are important for 
promoting reform in Ukraine. They are more flexible than the state research 
centres, are more trusted by society, and they generate new ideas.  
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29. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
The Association Agreement has well-developed 
legal mechanisms to handle disputes that may arise 
over the implementation of the Agreement. Since 
there will be so much political and economic 
business conducted between the two parties it is 
inevitable that issues will arise over the 
interpretation of specific provisions of the 
Agreement and its implementation.  
There are two basic dispute settlement mechanisms: a ‘general’ one 
applicable to all parts of the Agreement except the DCFTA and a second one 
applicable to the DCFTA itself. 
The general mechanism relies on the two parties finding a mutually 
agreed solution in the Association Council, failing which the aggrieved party 
may take ‘appropriate measures’. 
For DCFTA-related disputes there is a more elaborate system that 
provides two alternative tracks: either binding arbitration, or softer 
mediation for consensual solutions. 
There is also provision for the special case of violation of the ‘essential 
elements’ of the Agreement (i.e. basic political principles), which can lead to 
suspension of the entire Agreement. 
In practice these procedures are rarely used, as the EU for its part 
generally tries to find diplomatic solutions to problems that may arise. 
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30. INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Association Agreement establishes a 
comprehensive institutional framework to oversee 
its monitoring and implementation process.  
An annual EU-Ukraine summit, at 
presidential level, provides overall political 
guidance and an opportunity to discuss any bilateral 
or international issues of mutual interest. 
Below the summit level the key institution is 
the Association Council, composed of members of the EU Council and 
Commission on the one hand, and members of the government of Ukraine 
at ministerial level on the other. The Association Council has broad powers 
to amend many details of the Agreement (in its annexes), but it cannot 
change the main body of the Agreement since, being a treaty, this would 
require the complex procedures of ratification. 
The Association Council is assisted by an Association Committee at 
senior official level, with other specialised committees such as for trade 
matters, and sub-committees. These joint institutions are also responsible for 
the continuous updating of the Agreement, in particular in light of the 
relevant legislative developments in the EU itself.  
The Agreement established a Parliamentary Association Committee, 
consisting of Members of the European Parliament and the Verkhovna Rada, 
as well as a Civil Society Platform. 
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The new relationship between Ukraine and the European Union is the focus of 
this accessible, non-technical short guide. This relationship is based on a 
complex treaty: an Association Agreement with extensive political, economic 
and legal content, signed and entering into force provisionally in 2014 (in 2016 
for a trade part). The Agreement includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area (DCFTA). 
This booklet is a summary of the Handbook entitled Deepening Ukraine-EU 
Relations – What, why and how?, which explains the contents of the treaty in 
much greater depth. The Handbook, like the present booklet, is freely available 
at www.3dcftas.eu in both English and Ukrainian. Both publications follow the 
same chapter structure, which allows readers who wish to dig deeper into the 
subject to readily find their way in the longer Handbook. 
This short guide is produced as part of a project supported by the Swedish 
International Development Agency (Sida) and is one of a trilogy, with 
comparable companion texts also published on Georgia and Moldova. 
 
  
 
